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Introduction
The commons (or common-pool 
resources)1 are the most important 
resources in southern Africa. The liveli-
hoods of the majority and economies 
of most countries depend on them. 
Although common property regimes 
are often condemned as environ-
mentally unsustainable, economically 
unviable or socially anachronistic, this 
mode of natural resource tenure and 
governance remains vitally necessary 
in the livelihoods of the rural poor 
across much of the region (Hara et al., 
2009). Away from a limited number of 
project-based efforts for community-
based management (often focused on 
specific natural resource sectors), such 
as Zimbabwe’s high-profile CAMPFIRE, 
millions of poor, rural people across the 
region continue their own integrated 
efforts to manage and live from the 
ecosystems that surround them. This, 
above all, is a challenge to governance. 
The poor must tackle it – and govern-
ments and development agencies must 
support their endeavours (ibid.). 
This Policy Brief is based on synthetic 
studies undertaken by participants in 
the Cross Sectoral Commons Govern-
ance in Southern Africa (CROSCOG) 
project between 2007 and 2009, 
funded by the European Commission 
(European Commission: FP6-2002-IN-
CO-DEV/SSA-1, contract no. 043982). 
The objective of the project was to 
1. In line with international debates we define 
‘commons’ (or ‘common-pool resources’) firstly as 
‘resources that are difficult (but not impossible) 
to exclude other users from, and secondly as ‘sub-
tractable’, meaning that units used are no longer 
available to other users.
share existing research and experi-
ence in the governance of large-scale 
natural resource commons across 
various ecosystem types in southern 
Africa. CROSCOG took its starting point 
as the insight of Turner (2002), that 
‘finding long-term solutions to natural 
resource degradation in Africa means 
finding ways to identify; reproduce 
and encourage existing positive 
practices of commons management 
across wide scales in order to meet the 
two major inter-related challenges for 
governance of commons; conservation 
of natural resource biodiversity and 
poverty alleviation’. The programme’s 
work spanned fisheries; floodplains; 
and grasslands, savannas and forest 
patches, and had two phases. 
During the first phase, participants sum-
marised the status of commons govern-
ance in selected cases around southern 
Africa, spread across these ecosystem 
types (case studies to be published in 
Development Southern Africa* Issue 26 
Vol. 4 (October 2009)). These summaries 
situate the conditions of commons gov-
ernance and try to address the issues in 
terms of knowledge, political economy 
and power. The second phase, planned 
for presentation in a special issue of the 
International Journal of the Commons, 
will address the broader and more 
practical challenge: how to transfer 
commons governance experience from 
the usually localised scenarios in which 
it has been studied, and the generally 
limited situations in which it currently 
succeeds, to the communal areas of 
southern Africa as a whole. This Policy 
Brief summarises the findings and 
lessons from the programme:
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1. The commons are 
ecological systems that are 
critical for livelihoods! 
Most ecological systems in southern 
Africa are commons and shaped by 
human use that must be managed. This 
is true from local fisheries and grass-
lands to global commons such as the 
atmosphere. Commons are not empty 
relics; they play a critical role in liveli-
hoods and ecological systems even at 
relatively higher scales. For example, 
forest commons on the local level make 
an important contribution to solving 
problems of climate change that are 
themselves a global-scale commons. 
Commons need protection and the 
state alone cannot provide this protec-
tion. This requires local involvement. 
Local involvement means attention to 
meeting basic needs and promoting fair 
access to resources through effective 
policies. 
2. What is the government’s 
responsibility in enabling 
local involvement? 
Commons are usually owned by defined 
groups of people and government must 
create a legal and policy framework 
that respects group ownership rights. 
The problem is that commons tend 
to be treated as if there were no 
commoners, as if no one had rights to 
them. These rights need to be defined 
and enforced. In Africa these rights 
often stem from customary law. They 
can also be subject to rules developed 
by local communities through demo-
cratic processes. Community struc-
tures need to be legally empowered 
instead of repeating the all too 
frequent tendency to criminalise liveli-
hoods through micro-management of 
the commons. Policy makers need to 
reinforce the critical role played by local 
communities and customary practices 
because they reflect the community’s 
various moral, social, political, and 
economic incentives that drive human 
behaviour. Government achieves its 
objectives when problems are solved 
by local communities. The role that 
government must play is ensuring that 
these processes are transparent, fair 
and legitimate. 
3. Scaling up existing 
practices is a key to 
sustainable commons. 
The great challenge is that many 
commons involve huge numbers of 
communities, which requires govern-
ment to take up a coordination role. 
Some commons, such as the fish in a 
river, are shared over large areas; other 
commons are very complex because 
they involve combinations of resources. 
Large-scale and complex commons can 
in fact be managed when local people 
are involved. Governments should start 
with what they find on the ground. 
Some actions tear commons down 
while others preserve and sustain them; 
it is these latter actions, these practices 
of sustainable commons management, 
which must be replicated to meet the 
challenge of large-scale and complex 
commons. Many commons are cared for 
on smaller scales by existing practices 
such as resisting inappropriate fishing 
gears, organising the collective use 
of pastures, or monitoring forest and 
wildlife resources. The local rules regu-
lating these practices and government 
should facilitate the replication of 
these practices.
4. What has CROSCOG 
learned about the roles of 
different groups in scaling 
up commons practices?
Communities are different from one 
another. There are differences both 
within and among communities. 
Communities have choices about 
how to conserve their commons and 
part of scaling up is offering a choice 
of commons governance structures. 
Practices change and so do the groups 
using them. Lessons on scaling up 
and dealing with complex commons 
include:
a) Different types of platforms are 
possible where the various users 
can meet and negotiate the choice 
of practices across various scales. 
For example, effective fisheries 
management on Lake Mweru has 
involved two completely different 
kinds of community management 
committees with different mem-
berships, the Fishers Associations 
and the Village Management Com-
mittees, and both kinds of groups 
interact with the Department of 
Fisheries and traditional leaders on 
both local and regional scales. 
b) Experience with scaling up practices 
has shown that traditional leaders 
must be involved if the replica-
tion of practices is to be successful 
over the long term, but their in-
volvement has also proven prob-
lematic because there are so many 
different kinds of leaders and many 
are only weakly accountable to the 
broader community. The failure 
of the fisheries co-management 
programme on Lake Bangweulu 
can be linked to a decision by that 
programme not to work with the 
traditional authorities. 
c) The creation of local bylaws on the 
Kafue Flats showed the possibility 
of multiple stakeholders developing 
an agreement on management 
practices on a large and complex 
commons. 
d) Government intervention is required 
to compensate for the distortions 
created by commercialisation and 
relative prices that undermine the 
ability of local people to limit levels 
of commons exploitation. This can 
be seen in conflicts between sub-
sistence fishing, commercial fishing, 
sports fishing, and wildlife tourism 
in the Okavango Delta. 
e) The use of markets as a tool for 
addressing historical injustices 
has not been successful. Use of 
this approach to allocate rights in 
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commercial small pelagic fisheries in 
South Africa and the kapenta fishery 
in Zimbabwe highlight problems 
with this approach. 
f) Access to the commons is complex. 
When common resources are 
valuable and/or marketed over a 
large area local commoners are often 
not able to take advantage of the 
resources and must rely on external 
investment and expertise. Govern-
ment has an important role in moni-
toring these relationships in order to 
ensure fairness and create a support 
structure for local commoners. 
Various approaches to tourism in 
the Okavango Delta demonstrate 
both the possibility of partnership 
and the danger of exploitation. 
g) It is to the clear detriment of 
the commons that women are 
often its primary users but remain 
marginalised by many current 
decision-making processes and 
power structures that affect its 
condition. Any truly participatory, 
equitable approach to managing 
the commons must include space 
for the voices and concerns of both 
women and men, as well as different 
racial and ethnic groups. On a broad 
scale, this hinges on a strong com-
mitment to the establishment and 
protection of human rights, without 
exception, as well as the recognition 
that users of the commons have 
many responsibilities beyond 
natural resource management. 
Increasing human-elephant conflict 
in the Okavango Delta, for example, 
multiplies the burden for women 
who must work in fields affected 
by crop damage, share water points 
with elephants, and grapple with 
food security under environmental 
pressure, thereby increasing vulner-
ability rather than addressing social 
and economic inequalities.
Policy makers should also be aware of 
the need to scrutinise new threats to 
commons. This will require intergovern-
mental cooperation. Examples include 
large-scale movements to use land for 
biofuels and carbon sequestration that 
do not take local needs into account. 
Local voices must not be ignored at the 
international level. The role of research 
and public debate here requires greater 
investment because knowledge is 
patchy, scanty and incomplete. 
Conclusion
Whether our agenda is active intervention 
or simply accurate analysis, understanding 
the governance of the southern African 
commons requires us to consider the di-
mensions that affect their sustainable use, 
such as knowledge, economics and power. 
We also need to learn how to scale up good 
practices. The underlying argument is that 
if more commons around the region were 
studied from these analytical perspectives 
used under CROSCOG, it might be easier to 
share experiences and lessons in ways that 
can usefully inform development and con-
servation policy and programmes. 
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